Prime Ministerial Case Study – John Major
Following on from our look at one of Britain’s more celebrated Prime Ministers, Margaret Thatcher, we will now discuss her successor, John Major, a figure who has been much derided but whose premiership is now being somewhat re-evaluated.
As with Thatcher, lets consider how Major might be used as an example in potential exam questions. Of the two questions we will examine how he can be used as an example of a Prime Minister’s relationship with their cabinet:
- To what extent can a Prime Minister control the cabinet?
Major was gifted the luxury of inheriting a cabinet who had found their role and their voices subdued by the previous Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. Moreover, Thatcher had almost remorseless belittled and hectored members of her cabinet creating levels of both fear and animosity between the Prime Minister and her cabinet. In many regards this was a good position for Major to inherit. His more relaxed and collegial style was like a breath of fresh air and cabinet members said that they felt freer and more energised than they had done previously. Major’s collegiality almost expressed itself in his selection of cabinet members. Again, unlike his predecessor, who had sidelined those who were not true believers in her orthodoxy and labelled them wets, Major brought ministers from all sides of the party into his cabinet. In his first term (1990-1992) this policy worked wonders and Major’s new approach helped the Conservative Party to win an unlikely 5th election victory in a row in 1992.
However, after 1992, all of Major’s previous strengths soon became weaknesses. The economic crisis which began with Black Wednesday in September 1992 exposed Major’s leadership, calling into question his economic judgement. Soon, his decision to allow cabinet members to have their voices heard around the cabinet table did not look collegial, it looked weak and gave the impression of a Prime Minister who was indecisive and was looking to be persuaded. Moreover, his policy of brining together the warring factions of the party also backfired spectacularly. Soon rivals were beginning to emerge within the cabinet, often publicly briefing journalists about the wrongs of Major’s premiership. This was exposed by Major himself who was caught on camera referring to four ‘bastards’ in his cabinet who were leaking information to the press. Major’s explanation for keeping these ‘bastards’ in the cabinet was that they would cause him too many problems if they were sent to the backbenches. Again, this exposes Major’s weakness. A more aggressive and decisive Prime Minister would have sacked these ministers and shown them who was boss, Major however was just too agreeable, too keen to please.
Major’s lack of control came to a head in 1995 when he resigned as leader of the Conservative Party and told his detractors to ‘put up or shut up’. Although this was a brave move, it was far from a good look to see the Prime Minister having to put themselves up for re-election in the hope that his ministers might be forced to stop haranguing him.
Major’s lack of control of his cabinet only really became apparent after the 1992 election, an election whereby his majority was reduced from over 100 to just 21. With such a slim majority Major was always desperate to appease all sides of his cabinet and party and this allowed ministers to take advantage of his agreeable nature and push him into a corner on policy areas, particularly around Europe.
Therefore, Major is a great example of how cabinet control is again not a fixed entity. It can turn very quickly on other circumstances, particularly the size of the government’s majority and the degree to which the party is unified. When these disappear then often inherent personality flaws are more likely to be exposed. This was also the case for Theres May whom we will discuss in a later post.
